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Workers’ Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley ∗
J. Benson Ward ∗∗
The 2019–2020 survey period again featured decisions from the
Georgia Court of Appeals over an interesting array of workers’
compensation
topics
including:
robberies,
misrepresentations,
calculation disputes, and various potential employment situations. 1
There was no legislation of significance during the period.
I. ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT
Kil v. Legend Bros., LLC, 2 offers insight into unique circumstances
presented in going to and coming from work, as well as where the home
is a situs of employment. The claimant worked as a restaurant manager
and lived with the owner of the restaurant, and each day after work the
two spent time at home reviewing sales, receipts, and inventory. One
night after closing the restaurant, the owner drove the claimant and a
coworker home, and on arriving in the garage they were approached by
three men who demanded at gunpoint a bag of money. When the
attackers noticed that the claimant had a gun, they fled but shot at the
claimant, hitting him in the forearm. The claimant was hospitalized for
more than two weeks and underwent multiple surgeries. The claimant
requested workers’ compensation benefits, and the employer denied his
claim on grounds that the gunshot wound did not arise out of the course
of employment. 3
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the injury arose
out of and in the course of the claimant’s employment under the
∗ Partner, Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University (B.A.
1977); University of Georgia (J.D. 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
∗∗ Partner, Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.A.
summa cum laude 2002; J.D. cum laude 2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1 For an analysis of workers’ compensation during the prior survey period, see H.
Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers’ Compensation, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
71 MERCER L. REV. 345 (2019).
2 350 Ga. App. 680, 830 S.E.2d 245 (2019) (cert. denied Jan. 27, 2020).
3 Id. at 681, 830 S.E.2d at 247.
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continuous employment doctrine because the claimant was still acting in
his job as a manager at the time of the shooting, as a result of his
obligation to review the day’s receipts and inventory with the owner each
night at home. 4 The Board affirmed the finding of a compensable
accident, not under the continuous employment doctrine, but on grounds
that the accident occurred in the course of his employment because the
claimant was with the owner and planning on continuing to work at
home. 5 Further, the Board ruled that the injury arose out of the
employment because the circumstances of the robbery demonstrated that
the perpetrators had specifically targeted the men due to their connection
to the restaurant and expectations of them carrying money home from
the restaurant, thus, “the robbery would not have occurred but for the
circumstances of [the claimant’s] employment, and it is apparent that
there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the
employment was performed and the resulting injury.” 6 The employer
appealed to the Clayton Superior Court, which reversed the Board,
concluding that the injury did not arise out of the employment because it
occurred as the claimant arrived home from the restaurant, and he would
have had to return home after work regardless of the scope of his job. 7
Furthermore, the court noted he was not a traveling employee. 8
Moreover, the superior court noted that the claimant was shot because
he was carrying a gun, which the superior court observed was unrelated
to his duties for the employer. 9
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals first concluded that the Board
did not err in ruling that the injury occurred in the course of the
employment. 10 While the general rule in Georgia is that injuries
occurring while an employee travels to and from work are outside the
course of employment, the claimant’s specific job responsibilities and
unique circumstances in living with the owner and reviewing accounts
each night at home provided sufficient facts for the Board to determine
that the claimant was in the course of continuing to perform his job duties
as manager. 11 The men did not take any personal detours on the way
home and were in the process of performing their final job duties of

Id.
Id. at 682, 830 S.E.2d at 247–48.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Kil, 350 Ga. App. at 682, 830 S.E.2d at 247–48.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 683, 830 S.E.2d at 248.
11 Id. at 683, 830 S.E.2d at 248–49 (citing Avrett Plumbing Co. v. Castillo, 340 Ga. App.
671–72, 798 S.E.2d 268 (2017)).
4
5
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reviewing receipts. 12 Additionally, the court noted that the claimant was
with the owner in possession of job-related paperwork to resume their
work at home. 13 Accordingly, “under the unique circumstances of this
case,” the court determined that the Board did not err in determining
that the injury occurred in the course of the employment. 14
The court then turned to the issue of whether the accident arose out of
the employment, and determined that sufficient factual evidence existed
to support the Board’s finding that the injury arose out of the claimant’s
work. 15 The specific circumstances of the case, including the robbers
apparently specifically targeting the men due to their connection to the
restaurant and the likelihood that the men would return home late at
night with money from the restaurant, supported a finding of a causal
connection between the nature of the claimant’s employment and the
robbery. 16 The court of appeals disagreed with the superior court’s
conclusion that the claimant was equally exposed to the risk because he
would return home regardless of his job. This conclusion did not accord
with the Board’s finding that the claimant’s presence in the garage at the
time of the robbery was a direct result of his job responsibilities; that is,
the court noted that the issue was whether the claimant’s job
responsibilities were the proximate cause of his injury. Here, the court
noted that some evidence existed to support the Board’s findings. 17 The
court reversed the superior court and affirmed the Board’s rulings as they
were supported by some evidence. 18
In Smith v. Camarena, 19 the court of appeals explored the parameters
of the “ingress/egress rule” in public parking from the perspective of a
civil defendant attempting to utilize the exclusive remedy of the Workers’
Compensation Act 20 as a defense. 21 The employee was shot and killed in
the parking lot outside the grocery store where she was employed, and
her mother and her estate brought a tort suit against the store and its
owners and managers. The deceased employee clocked out as the store
was closing, left the store, and walked into the parking lot to talk with a
Id. at 683, 830 S.E.2d at 248–49.
Kil, 350 Ga. App. at 683, 830 S.E.2d at 248 (citing Amedisys Home Health, Inc. v.
Howard, 269 Ga. App. 656, 658, 605 S.E.2d 60 (2004)).
14 Id. at 683, 830 S.E.2d at 249.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 684, 830 S.E.2d at 250.
17 Id. at 684–85, 830 S.E.2d at 249–50 (citing Sturgess v. OA Logistics Svcs., Inc., 336
Ga. App. 134, 138-39, 784 S.E.2d 432 (2016); Cartersville City Schools v. Johnson, 345 Ga.
App. 290, 296-97, 812 S.E.2d 605 (2018)).
18 Kil, 350 Ga. App. at 685, 830 S.E.2d at 250.
19 352 Ga. App. 797, 835 S.E.2d 712 (2019).
20 O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1–34-9-432 (2019).
21 Smith, 352 Ga. App. at 797, 835 S.E.2d at 713.
12
13
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coworker who was sitting in a parked car with the coworker’s husband.
The employer did not own or control the parking lot, which was owned
and controlled by the store’s landlord, served multiple businesses in the
shopping center, and was open to the public. While the two women were
talking in the parking lot, two men approached, pointed a gun, and
demanded their purses. At this time the grocery store’s assistant
manager saw the robbery in progress as he was leaving the store and
confronted the robbers. The assistant manager also had a firearm, and
he and the robbers exchanged gunfire. The robbers fled but the employee
was shot in the gunfire and subsequently died. 22
The defendants in the civil suit moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the case was barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive
remedy provision, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a), 23 because the injury was
compensable under the Act. The trial court granted summary judgment
based on the exclusive remedy provision, and the plaintiffs appealed. The
plaintiffs argued that the shooting might have arisen out of employment,
but it did not occur in the course of the employment, because the deceased
employee was shot after work at “a location that was not owned,
maintained, or controlled by her employer.” 24
The court of appeals observed that whether an injury occurs in the
course of employment depends on whether the injury took place during
the period of employment at a location where the employee reasonably
would be in the performance of her duties or whether the injury occurred
during a time when the employee is off duty, free to do as she pleases,
and not performing any job duties. 25 While the deceased employee was
off duty at the time of the shooting, the defendants argued that the
claimant was still in the course of her employment because of the
ingress/egress rule, which generally provides that an employee’s period
of employment ordinarily includes a reasonable time before and after
work for the employee to enter and leave the place of work while on the
employer’s premises. 26 Ordinarily, an injury that occurs in a parking lot
owned and maintained by the employer will be deemed to have occurred
on the employer’s premises for purposes of the ingress/egress rule. 27
However, as noted by the court of appeals, the key distinction is whether
the parking lot is owned, controlled, and maintained by the employer;

Id. at 797–98, 835 S.E.2d at 714.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(a) (2020).
24 Smith, 352 Ga. App. 798–99, 835 S.E.2d at 714.
25 Id. at 799, 835 S.E.2d at 714–15 (citations omitted).
26 Id. at 799, 835 S.E.2d at 715 (citing Peoples v. Emory Univ., 206 Ga. App. 213, 424
S.E.2d 874 (1992)).
27Smith, 352 Ga. App. 799, 835 S.E.2d at 715. (citing Tate v. Bruno’s, Inc./Food Max,
200 Ga. App. 395, 408 S.E.2d 456 (1991)).
22
23
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where the parking lot is not owned, controlled, nor maintained by the
employer, then the parking lot is not part of the employer’s premises and
the ingress/egress rule should not apply. 28 Because the parking lot was
neither owned, controlled, nor maintained by the employer, an issue
remained as to whether the defendants could show that the injury
occurred in the course of the employment, and thus the court of appeals
reversed the summary judgment decision. 29 The court distinguished the
defendants’ arguments that the positional risk doctrine supported
summary judgment (on grounds that the employment brought the
deceased employee within the range of the danger), 30 because this
doctrine addresses whether an injury arose out of the employment, not
whether it occurred in the course of the employment. 31
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hawkins, 32 the court of appeals
reiterated the Board’s fact-finding prerogative, in the context of a
claimant reaching maximum medical improvement and returning to full
duty work status. 33 The claimant had an accident at work in October
2015 when she tripped backwards and fell to the floor, but she did not
immediately seek medical treatment. The employer did not have a proper
posted panel of physicians at the time of the accident, but one of the
owners talked with its insurer after the accident and compiled a panel of
physicians and authorized treatment with a physician selected from the
panel by the claimant. The claimant presented for her initial visit with
the authorized treating physician (ATP) with complaints of neck, arm,
shoulder, and lower back pain. The ATP found no significant acute
findings, and following testing, placed the claimant on light duty work
restrictions and referred the claimant to his partner for further shoulder
treatment. The shoulder doctor found no sign of a rotator cuff tear and
kept the claimant on work restrictions per the ATP. A little over one year
after the date of accident, the claimant told the employer that she needed
a light-duty job. A pain management physician recommended light-duty
work restrictions in February 2017, and the employer fired the claimant
in March 2017, in part because she could not perform her regular job. 34
28 Smith, 352 Ga. App. 799, 835 S.E.2d at 715. (citing City of Atlanta v. Spearman, 209
Ga. App. 644, 434 S.E.2d 87 (1993)).
29 Smith, 352 Ga. App. at 800–02, 835 S.E.2d at 715, 717.
30 Id. at 800, 835 S.E.2d at 715–16 (citing DeKalb Collision Ctr., Inc. v. Foster, 254 Ga.
App. 477, 480, 562 S.E.2d 740, 743–44 (2002)).
31 Id., 835 S.E.2d at 716
32 353 Ga. App. 681, 839 S.E.2d 230 (2020).
33 Id. at 681, 839 S.E.2d 232.
34 Id. at 681–82, 839 S.E.2d at 232–33.
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The claimant underwent a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) in
May 2017 where she was assessed as having given a self-limiting effort.
The FCE provider opined that “unless an objective medical reason exists
that would preclude return-to-work,” the claimant “should be returned to
work.” 35 The claimant returned to her shoulder doctor, who opined that
she remained symptomatic and so she was kept on light duty work
restrictions. The employer sent the claimant for an independent medical
evaluation (IME) in May 2017, after which the IME doctor opined that
the claimant was capable of regular duty, full-time work, and required
no further medical treatment for her on-the-job injury. The claimant
returned to the ATP in June 2017, where the ATP noted left shoulder
dysfunction but had no further treatment to offer and deferred any work
restrictions to the shoulder doctor. In August 2017, after being presented
with the claimant’s deposition testimony and surveillance, the shoulder
doctor opined that the claimant had reached maximum medical
improvement and had no work restrictions, and no further medical
treatment of her upper extremity was necessary. The claimant changed
her ATP and underwent an IME with a doctor of her choice, and her IME
doctor opined that she required further medical treatment and needed
light duty work restrictions from her injury. 36
The claimant requested compensation for her October 2015 injury, and
also alleged a fictional new accident for her last date worked in March
2017. The claimant sought to have her IME doctor designated as her new
ATP. At a hearing, the ALJ found that the claimant had a compensable
2015 injury as well as a compensable new accident in March 2017.
However, the ALJ found that the claimant’s injuries had resolved as of
August 2017, when her shoulder doctor opined that she could return to
regular duty work and needed no further treatment. The ALJ thus
awarded income benefits from the date of her termination until the date
the shoulder doctor returned her to full duty work status, but denied her
requests to change ATP and for further treatment. 37 On appeal, “[t]he
Board adopted the ALJ’s [hearing award] in its entirety.” 38 The Fulton
Superior Court reversed, finding that the employer failed to have a valid
panel of physicians and had a right to a change of physicians, and based
on the claimant’s IME report, she still required work restrictions and
further medical care. The superior court also reversed the Board’s finding
that an assessment of attorney’s fees was not warranted based on its

Id. at 682, 839 S.E.2d at 233.
Id. at , 839 S.E.2d at 233.
37 Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 353 Ga. App. at 683–84, 839 S.E. at 234.
38 Id. at 684–85, 839 S.E.2d at 234.
35
36
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finding that State Farm illegally denied the claimant a change of
physician. 39
The court of appeals observed that the superior court was not
authorized to disregard or reweigh the evidence, as that is the Board’s
province. 40 Instead, on appeal, the court evaluated whether some
evidence exists to support the Board’s finding. 41 Because medical
evidence existed to support the Board’s findings that the work-related
injuries had resolved as of August 2017, the superior court erred in
reversing the Board’s finding. 42 Similarly, the court ruled that the
superior court erred when it reversed the Board’s denial of the claimant’s
request to change ATP notwithstanding the Board’s determination that
no additional medical treatment was required, because evidence existed
to support the Board’s finding that the claimant’s injuries had resolved
as of August 2017, and the claimant was not entitled to a change of
physician. 43 Lastly, the court of appeals held that the superior court erred
in concluding that the claimant was automatically entitled to a change of
physician because the record supported the Board’s determination that
the employer acted based on reasonable grounds; thus the superior
court’s award of attorney’s fees was reversed. 44
In Burch v. STF Foods, Inc., 45 the court addressed the Board’s
factfinding role in the context of a claimant’s termination of
employment. 46 The claimant, an employee at a Wendy’s restaurant,
reported multiple injuries while performing his job, including injuring
his upper back moving a pot of chili and straining his eyes and upper
back/shoulder area after trying to lift a trash bag, both occurring in
January 2013. He was treated at a clinic, where he was told to take off
work for three days and then work light duty for a week. In June 2013
he aggravated his existing back/shoulder injuries and a stack of boxes fell
on him in November 2013. The employer fired the claimant in December
2013 for insubordination related to his continuing to lift items at work.
The claimant filed a hearing request seeking temporary partial disability
(TPD) benefits from January 2013 through his firing date in December
2013, temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from his firing in
December 2013, and medical expenses. 47
Id. at 685, 839 S.E.2d at 235.
Id. at 685–86, 839 S.E.2d at 235.
41 Id. at 686, 839 S.E.2d 235.
42 Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 353 Ga. App. at 686, 839 S.E. at 235.
43 Id. at 686–88, 839 S.E.2d 235–36.
44 Id. at 688, 839 S.E.2d 236–37.
45 353 Ga. App. 172, 836 S.E.2d 573 (2019) (reconsideration denied (Nov. 14, 2019)).
46 Id. at Ga. App. 172–73, 836 S.E.2d at 574–75.
47 Id. at 173, 836 S.E.2d at 575.
39
40
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The ALJ found that the claimant had injured himself at work in
January and November 2013, for which he was entitled to medical
treatment; however the ALJ denied his request for TPD benefits because
he had no wage loss during the time period sought. The Judge found that
the claimant’s termination for insubordination was related to his injuries
and reduced work capacity, such that he was awarded TTD benefits. The
Board upheld the award of medical benefits, but found that the primary
cause of his termination was insubordination and not work-related
injuries or limitations, and so reversed the award of TTD benefits. The
Coffee Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision on grounds that it
was supported by evidence in the record. 48
The claimant argued on appeal that the Board should not have
reversed the ALJ’s finding that he was terminated for reasons connected
to his work injury; he argued that the termination was based on
insubordination due to his injuries and his need for light-duty work.
However, the Board found that the proximate cause of the termination
was his insubordination, not “the injuries nor the need for light duty,
which were indirect causes at best.” 49 The court of appeals noted the “any
evidence” standard of review on appeal and observed that the proximate
cause of a claimant’s “termination is a factual determination reserved for
the . . . Board.” 50 Because some evidence existed to support the finding
that the proximate cause of the claimant’s firing was insubordination and
thus he did not stop working as a result of his injuries, the court of
appeals held that the superior court did not err in affirming the Board’s
award. 51
III. APPLICATION MISREPRESENTATIONS AND VOIDING A POLICY
In Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Bennett, 52 the court of appeals
addressed whether alleged misrepresentations in an application for
insurance would allow an insurer to void a policy of workers’
compensation insurance ab initio after the insurer decided to cancel the
policy. 53
The employer, a construction company that primarily dealt with
greenhouse repairs and maintenance services, engaged its insurance
agent to obtain a new policy of workers’ compensation insurance. There
was a dispute between the employer and its agent regarding the
insurance application process, including whether the employer signed a
Id. at 173–74, 836 S.E.2d at 575–76.
Id. at 174–75, 836 S.E.2d at 576.
50 Burch, 353 Ga. App. at 176, 836 S.E.2d at 577.
51 Id. at 176–77, 836 S.E.2d at 577.
52 350 Ga. App. 608, 829 S.E.2d 834 (2019) (cert. denied Jan. 13, 2020).
53 Grange, 350 Ga. App. at 611, 829 S.E.2d at 836.
48
49
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blank application or reviewed a completed application. The facts show
that the application contained inaccurate information, including
classifying the construction company’s work as janitorial in nature and
as reflecting that the employer did not perform work outside of Georgia
whereas the business operated in thirty states. After the employer
reported to the insurer that an employee was injured in another state,
the insurer audited the business operations and its underwriter later
testified that the insurer would not have issued the policy if the
application correctly reflected that the employer operated in thirty states
and had employees working at heights above fifteen feet. Following
deliberation, the insurer declined to void the policy ab initio for
misrepresentations in the application and instead sent the business a
cancellation notice. 54
On the day before the policy was scheduled to cancel, the claimant was
injured in an accident out of state and filed a workers’ compensation
claim. At the hearing before the ALJ, the insurer argued that the policy
did not cover out-of-state work injuries, that the employer’s owner did
not advise the insurer of the employer’s need for multi-state coverage,
and that the insurer would not have issued the policy if it had received
an accurate description of the employer’s business operations. The ALJ
rejected these arguments and found that the policy covered the
claimant’s injury. The ALJ ruled that, had the insurer wanted to limit
coverage to only accidents in Georgia, it was required to amend or
endorse the policy with that limitation; however, the current policy
agreed to pay workers’ compensation claims under the laws of Georgia,
and under Georgia law out-of-state injuries can be compensable. 55 In its
appeal to the Board, the insurer argued that the policy was void pursuant
to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7 56 due to application misrepresentations, however
the Board upheld the ALJ’s decision. 57
On appeal before the Hall Superior Court, the court remanded to the
Board to determine whether the policy was void for application
misrepresentations. On remand, the Board ruled that the insurer waived
the application misrepresentation defense by not raising the issue before
the ALJ; however, the Board also ruled that the insurer did not prove the
merits of voiding the policy under O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7, as the
misrepresentations were deemed inadvertent and non-material, and the
Board was unpersuaded by the insurer’s argument that it would not have

Id. at 609–10, 829 S.E.2d at 835–36.
Id. at 610, 829 S.E.2d at 836.
56 O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7 (1982).
57 Grange, 350 Ga. App. at 610–611, 829 S.E.2d at 836.
54
55
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issued a multi-state policy. The superior court then affirmed the Board’s
order, and the insurer appealed that decision. 58
The insurer argued before the court of appeals that it sufficiently
raised the application misrepresentation defense before the ALJ, and
that the Board misapplied O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7; however, the court did not
reach these arguments. 59 Instead, the court ruled that the insurer waived
its application misrepresentation defense well before the ALJ hearing. 60
The court of appeals noted that the insurer essentially had two options
after discovering inaccurate information in the application (i.e., potential
application misrepresentation)—it could either promptly rescind the
policy or cancel the policy. 61 The court held that the insurer waived its
defense that the application misrepresentation voided the policy when,
once it discovered the inaccurate information in the application, the
insurer opted to cancel coverage instead of promptly rescinding the
policy. 62 The court of appeals likened the case to Loeb v. Nationwide
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 63 where after learning of alleged material
misrepresentations on an insurance application the insurer canceled the
insurance policy instead of rescinding the policy and returning the
premiums, and so the policy was not later deemed void ab initio for
purposes of denying a claim. 64 The court disagreed with the insurer that
the matter before the court was indistinguishable from American
Resources Insurance Co. v. Conner, 65 as the insurer sought to argue that
the application misrepresentations “undermine[d] the validity of the
entire policy, not just [an endorsement or] a portion of the policy.” 66
IV. STANDARD OF PROOF—STROKE
The case of Henry County Board of Education v. Rutledge 67 saw the
court of appeals again evaluate the proper legal standard for determining
whether a stroke was compensable. 68 The claimant alleged that he
sustained a work-related stroke, which the employer contested. The
claimant, a bus driver for the school system, saw steam or smoke coming
out of the dashboard and then apparently passed out and “was taken to
Id. at 611, 829 S.E.2d at 836.
Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 611–12, 829 S.E.2d at 836–37 (citations omitted).
62 Grange, 350 Ga. App. at 612, 829 S.E.2d at 837.
63 162 Ga. App. 561, 292 S.E.2d 409 (1982).
64 Grange, 350 Ga. App. at 612, 829 S.E.2d at 837.
65 209 Ga. App. 885, 434 S.E.2d 737 (1993).
66 350 Ga. App. at 613, 829 S.E.2d at 838.
67 354 Ga. App. 643, 839 S.E.2d 684 (2020) (reconsideration denied Mar. 19, 2020).
68 Henry County, 354 Ga. App at 643, 839 S.E.2d at 685.
58
59
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the hospital, where it was determined that he had suffered a stroke.” 69
The claimant argued that “his exposure to smoke on the bus was either
an aggravating factor or precipitating cause of his stroke,” and the
employer contended that the stroke was caused by factors unrelated to
the job including possibly hypertension, diabetes, and his inability to
monitor his glucose for a month due to a broken monitor. 70
The case first resulted in the ALJ and Board finding that the stroke
was not caused by the claimant being on the bus; however, the Henry
Superior Court remanded the case to the Board to evaluate whether
being on the bus contributed to or worsened the stroke, and the case was
remanded to the ALJ to make such additional findings. 71 On remand, the
ALJ noted conflicting evidence of medical causation, and found that the
claimant “met his burden to show that his work duties and an incident
at work significantly contributed” to the stroke and therefore it was
compensable. 72 The Board disagreed with the ALJ’s evaluation of the
medical evidence and reversed, finding insufficient evidence to show an
aggravation injury. 73 The superior court in turn again vacated the
Board’s decision and remanded for a specific finding as to whether there
was an aggravation. 74
On appeal, the court of appeals observed that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) 75
provides that an “injury” under the Act does not include several medical
conditions including strokes unless it is shown by a preponderance of
competent and credible evidence—including medical evidence—that the
stroke was attributable to the performance of the work. 76 The court
observed that the Board’s decision addressed whether the stroke was an
aggravation injury due to the claimant’s exposure to the substance on the
school bus, and the Board had rejected the claimant’s argument that
exposure to the substance on the bus contributed to or worsened his
preexisting condition. 77 Accordingly, in evaluating whether the
claimant’s exposure on the bus contributed to or aggravated his injury,
the Board applied the proper legal framework and the correct standard
of proof, so there was no basis for the superior court to vacate the Board’s
decision. 78

Id. at 643, 839 S.E.2d at 686.
Id. at 643–44, 839 S.E.2d at 686.
71 Id. at 644, 839 S.E.2d at 686.
72 Id.
73 Henry County, 354 Ga. App at 644, S.E.2d at 686.
74 Id.
75 O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (2020).
76 Henry County, 354 Ga. App. at 645, 839 S.E.2d at 686–87.
77 Id. at 645, 839 S.E.2d at 687.
78 Id. at 645–46, 839 S.E.2d at 687.
69
70
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V. STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT
Mullinax v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation 79 involved a truck driver for
Mountain Milk Hauling, a business which contracted with Pilgrim’s
Pride Corporation (Pilgrim’s), to transport grown chickens from farms to
designated locations. Pilgrim’s had also contracted with Garren Benton
Hall to raise Pilgrim’s chickens on his farm, and with Rising, Inc. to catch
the chickens at farms and load them into cages. The truck driver was at
Hall’s chicken farm in the early morning hours while Rising employees
were catching chickens, when one of his coworkers attempted to operate
a forklift that was left with a key in its ignition by a Rising employee.
The coworker was not authorized to use the forklift and, while reversing
the forklift, he ran over the truck driver, who died. 80
The deceased employee’s wife filed a civil suit against Pilgrim’s Pride
(the chicken manufacturing company), Rising, Inc. (the company that
contracted with Pilgrim’s to catch and load the chickens for transport),
and Garren Benton Hall (the owner of the farm where the accident
occurred). 81 The widow also filed a workers’ compensation claim against
Mountain Milk. Pilgrim’s moved for summary judgment in the civil suit
on grounds that it was the statutory employer of the deceased employee
and therefore the exclusive remedy provision barred Pilgrim’s from tort
liability, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Pilgrim’s on
those grounds. 82 The Plaintiff argued on appeal that Pilgrim’s should not
be deemed a statutory employer because a fact issue remained as to
whether Pilgrim’s exercised control over the farm and Pilgrim’s was the
owner of the enterprise. 83
The court of appeals first observed that Pilgrim’s was a principal
contractor under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a), 84 as it contracted with Mountain
Milk to transport chickens in order to fulfill Pilgrim’s own contracts with
its customers. 85 The court pointed out that Pilgrim’s ownership of the
chickens did not preclude it from being a principal contractor. 86 The court
then noted that the accident occurred on a chicken farm where Pilgrim’s
had undertaken to execute work through a subcontractor, Mountain
Milk, thus meeting the statute’s condition that statutory employment
required the injury to occur on or about “the premises on which the
354 Ga. App. 186, 840 S.E.2d 666 (2020).
Id. at 186–87, 840 S.E.2d at 670–71.
81 Id. at 186, 840 S.E.2d at 670.
82 Id. at 187, 840 S.E.2d at 671.
83 Id. at 188, 840 S.E.2d at 671.
84 O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a) (2020).
85 Mullinax, 354 Ga. App. at 189, 840 S.E.2d at 672.
86 Id. at 189, 840 S.E.2d at 672 (citing Patterson v. Bristol Timber Co., 286 Ga. App. 423,
649 S.E.2d 795 (2007)).
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principal contractor has undertaken to execute work or which are
otherwise under his control or management.” 87 The court of appeals
likened the situation to that found in American Mutual Liability
Insurance Co. v. Fuller, 88 where the principal contractor entered into a
hauling contract with the Plaintiff’s employer to transport poultry from
Georgia to New Jersey and the Plaintiff was injured on a highway, and
in that case the court stated that because the contract “contemplated the
hauling of . . . freight on the highways . . . the highways were ‘premises’
on which the principal contractor has undertaken to execute work.” 89 In
the present case, Pilgrim’s had a contract with the decedent’s employer
for the hauling of Pilgrim’s chickens from specific farms to specific
Pilgrim’s locations, thus for purposes of that work Hall’s chicken farm
was the premises on which Pilgrim’s had undertaken to execute work.
Because Pilgrim’s was a principal contractor under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8(a)
and because Hall’s chicken farm constituted premises on which Pilgrim’s
undertook to execute work, Pilgrim’s was the decedent’s statutory
employer and so immune from tort liability under the exclusive remedy
provision. 90
Rising, Inc. also argued that it should be immune from tort liability
under the Act on grounds that it was involved in a joint venture with the
other defendants including Pilgrim’s, as one joint venturer is immune
from tort liability to its joint venturer’s employees. 91 However, the court
noted that an issue of fact remained as to whether a joint venture
existed. 92 The contract between Pilgrim’s and Rising provides that the
agreement is not intended to create a joint venture, and Rising did not
show evidence that it had a right to direct and control the conduct of the
employees of the other defendants or Mountain Milk’s employees. 93 The
court thus reversed a grant of summary judgment to Rising on joint
venture grounds. 94 The court similarly declined to agree with Hall’s
argument that it was involved in a joint venture, as the contract
disclaimed any joint venture and there was no evidence showing that
Hall could direct and control the conduct of any other party’s
employees. 95

Id. at 189–90, 840 S.E.2d at 672–73 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (d)).
123 Ga. App. 585, 181 S.E.2d 876 (1971).
89 Mullinax, 354 Ga. App. At 190, 840 S.E.2d at 673 (quoting American Mutual, at 587–
88, 181 S.E.2d at 878).
90 354 Ga. App. 190–91, 840 S.E.2d at 673.
91 Id. at 194–95, 840 S.E.2d at 675–76.
92 Id. at 195, 840 S.E.2d at 676.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 195, 840 S.E.2d at 676.
95 Mullinax, 354 Ga. App. at 199, 840 S.E.2d at 678.
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VI. EMPLOYEE OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
In Estes v. G&W Carriers, LLC, 96 a wife and her husband were tractortrailer drivers who worked for the employer as a team, rotating driving
responsibilities on their trips. On a cross-country trip hauling a load of
carpet where the husband was driving and the wife was in the sleeping
compartment of the tractor-trailer, the husband wrecked the truck and
the wife was injured. The wife brought a civil suit against the employer,
alleging that her husband’s conduct caused the accident and that his
liability could be imputed to the employer. 97 The employer moved for
summary judgment on grounds that the action was barred by the
exclusive remedy provision and on grounds that the action was barred by
O.C.G.A. § 34-7-21’s 98 provision that “the employer shall not be liable to
one employee for injuries arising from the negligence or misconduct of
other employees about the same business,” and the trial court granted
summary judgment. 99
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the issue of whether she was an
independent contractor or an employee was a fact issue for the jury. 100
The court of appeals disagreed, noting that there was no issue of fact on
the employment issue. 101 The employer hired the husband and wife, had
authority over their tractor trailer, handled the tractor trailer’s operating
costs, maintenance, and inspections, and was responsible for assigning
trips, and drivers could only decline a load under certain limited
circumstances. 102 Because the employer had the right to control the time,
manner and method of the plaintiff’s work, “the fact that [it] issued its
workers International Revenue Services Form 1099[s] . . . and did not
withhold taxes” did not change the workers’ status as employees. 103
Because the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, the court of
appeals ruled that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the exclusive
remedy provision and summary judgment was proper. 104

354 Ga. App. 156, 840 S.E.2d 486 (2020).
Id. at 156, 840 S.E.2d at 487.
98 O.C.G.A. § 34-7-21 (2019).
99 Estes, 354 Ga. App. at 156, 840 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-7-21).
100 Id. at 156, 840 S.E.2d at 487.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 158, 840 S.E.2d at 488.
103 Id. at 159, 840 S.E.2d at 489 (quoting Boatright v. Old Domionion Ins., 304 Ga. App.
119, 122, 695 S.E.2d 408, 412 (2010)).
104 Estes, 354 Ga. App. at 159, 840 S.E.2d at 489.
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VII. BORROWED SERVANT DOCTRINE
In Sprowson v. Villalobos, 105 the court ruled that the employee of a
business using the services of a temporary help contracting firm cannot
be held liable in tort to a temporary employee injured while assigned to
the defendant’s employer. 106
Waste Pro USA, Inc. entered into a contract with True Blue
Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Labor Ready Southeast, Inc., under which Waste
Pro USA paid Labor Ready for providing temporary employees to perform
work under the direction of Waste Pro USA. Labor Ready assigned the
Plaintiff to work for Waste Pro of South Carolina, Inc., and he was
injured while working on a truck owned by Waste Pro USA and driven
by an employee of Waste Pro of South Carolina. The Plaintiff filed a civil
suit against multiple Waste Pro entities and the driver of the truck, and
also received workers’ compensation benefits from Labor Ready. The trial
court granted summary judgment dismissing the Waste Pro entities but
found that the plaintiff was not barred by the exclusive remedy provision
from suing the truck driver. 107
The court noted that in Georgia, a “borrowed servant is [considered]
an employee of the same employer of any regular employee of the
borrowing employer.” 108 An individual is a borrowed servant where “(1)
the special master had complete control and direction of the [individual]
for the occasion; (2) the general master had no such control; (3) and the
special master had the exclusive right to discharge the servant.” 109 The
undisputed evidence in the present case showed that all three prongs of
the borrowed servant test were met, as the contract between Labor Ready
and Waste Pro USA reflected that Waste Pro USA was responsible for
supervising the temporary employees and that Waste Pro USA could
request for Labor Ready to remove employees with poor performance. 110
Because all elements of the borrowed servant test were met, the Plaintiff
was an employee of the same employer as the truck driver under
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). 111 Therefore, the defendant driver could not be
held liable in tort. 112

355 Ga. App. 279, 841 S.E.2d 453 (2020).
Id. at 279–80, 841 S.E.2d at 454–55.
107 Id. at 280, 841 S.E.2d at 455.
108 Id. at 281, 841 S.E.2d at 455 (quoting Underwood v. Burt, 185 Ga. App. 381, 382, 364
S.E.2d 100, 102 (1987)).
109 Sprowson, 355 Ga. App. at 281, 841 S.E.2d at 455–56 (quoting Stephens v. Oates, 189
Ga. App. 6, 7, 374 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1988)).
110 Sprowson, 355 Ga. App. at 282, 841 S.E.2d at 456.
111 Id. at 282–83, 841 S.E.2d at 456.
112 Id.
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The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the case of Long
v. Marvin M. Black Co., 113 precluded immunity. 114 Long involved an
injured employee of a subcontractor and an alleged tortfeasor who was
an employee of the principal contractor, where under such employment
circumstances the two individuals were not deemed employees of the
same employer, and that case did not involve the borrowed servant
doctrine. 115 The court also found unpersuasive the plaintiff’s argument
that, if the defendant truck driver’s employer could be considered the
plaintiff’s statutory employer under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(c), 116 as the
statute included temporary help contracting firms, the two men were no
longer employees of the same employer. 117 However, the court of appeals
stated that the borrowed servant doctrine provides an additional and
alternative path, beyond the statutory employer option, for the two men
to be considered employees of the same employer. 118 Under the facts of
the case, the court ruled that the defendant truck driver was immune
from tort liability under the exclusive remedy provision. 119
VIII. AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
In Ware County Board of Education v. Taft, 120 the Ware Superior
Court returned to the issue of determining an employee’s average weekly
wage (AWW), specifically whether to use actual prorated pay or the
amount earned over the pay period to include amounts deferred and paid
out later. 121
The claimant worked for the Board of Education as a custodian on a
school-year schedule of 220 days; however, his pay was prorated and
spread over a full calendar year. He incurred a compensable accident in
June 2016 and begun receiving TTD benefits, but contended that he was
entitled to additional benefits on grounds that the AWW calculation was
incorrect. The ALJ and Board found that the claimant’s contract
“required that he be paid $9.20 per hour for a 40-hour work week,” that
he work 220 days during the school year, and that “his total
compensation was $16,192.00 disbursed in equal monthly installments
of $1,349.33 throughout a 12-month year.” 122 These amounts were not in
250 Ga. 621, 300 S.E.2d 150 (1983).
Sprowson, 355 Ga. App. at 283, 841 S.E.2d at 456.
115 355 Ga. App. at 283, 841 S.E.2d at 456–57.
116 O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(c) (2020).
117 Sprowson, 355 Ga. App. at 283–84, 841 S.E.2d at 457.
118 Id. at 284, 841 S.E.2d at 457.
119 Id. at 285, 841 S.E.2d at 458.
120 350 Ga. App. 848, 830 S.E.2d 326 (2019).
121 Id. at 848, 830 S.E.2d at 327.
122 Id. at 849, 830 S.E.2d at 327.
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dispute, nor was it disputed that the claimant worked substantially the
whole of the thirteen weeks immediately preceding the accident. He
worked a total of fifty-nine days during that period, or eleven weeks and
four days. Thus, under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260(1), 123 the claimant’s AWW
“shall be one-thirteenth of the total amount of wages earned in such
employment during the 13 weeks.” 124 The Board found that the AWW
should be calculated by multiplying the claimant’s contractual hourly
rate of $9.20 by fifty-nine, eight-hour days, and then divide by thirteen,
for an AWW of $334.03. Thus, the Board calculated the AWW not by his
actual gross wages during the thirteen-week period, “but by including the
amounts that were deferred and paid out over the full calendar year.” 125
On appeal, the employer argued that the claimant’s AWW “should be
calculated based upon what he actually was paid during the 13 weeks
immediately preceding the injury.” 126 In other words, the employer
argued that the actual gross wages during the thirteen weeks should
determine the AWW, which would be $334.03. The claimant argued that
the statutory language total amount of wages earned in O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-260(1) means his earnings for actual time worked, that is the
contractual rate of hourly pay at eight hours per day for the fifty-nine
days worked. 127
The court of appeals noted that the Georgia Supreme Court has
determined that a plain and ordinary reading of a statute should be
afforded when considering the statute’s meaning. 128 While the term
“wage” in the statute has been defined, the court stated that the term
“earned” was undefined. 129 The court observed that that the claimant
“earned $334.03 gross weekly wages by working 40 hours at his
contractual hourly rate of $9.20 for 59 days within the 13-week period,
[however] a portion of those earnings were withheld, and [] later paid on
a pro-rated basis over 12 months,” so that there would be no pay gaps
over the course of a year. 130
The court concluded that the claimant had earned his contractual rate
of pay once he had actually performed the work for which he was being
paid, regardless of when that pay was received, and so the statutory term
“wages earned” should focus on when the claimant earned the money

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260(1) (2020).
Ware Cnty., 350 Ga. App. at 849, 830 S.E.2d at 328 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-6-260 (1)).
125 Ware Cnty., 350 Ga. App. at 849, 830 S.E.2d at 328
126 Id. at 850, 830 S.E.2d at 328.
127 Id. at 850, 830 S.E.2d at 328.
128 Id. (citing Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172–173, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013)).
129 Ware Cnty., 350 Ga. App. at 851, 830 S.E.2d at 328–29.
130 Id. at 851, 830 S.E.2d at 329.
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under his contract, regardless of when he received that money. 131 The
court of appeals therefore upheld the Board’s determination of the
$334.03 AWW as the amount that the claimant actually earned during
the thirteen-week period, even if some of those earnings were withheld
for payment at later dates. 132

131
132

Id. at 851, 830 S.E.2d at 329.
Id.

